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The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral
and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's devel-
opment through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a
book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must
know what it has been and what it tends to become. We
must alternately consult history and existing theories of
legislation. But the most difficult labor will be to under-
stand the combination of the two into new products at
every stage.1
The development of environmental law is a story whose
denouement is found in lengthy statutes that were sculpted
by public policy reflecting the prevalent political, economic,
and moral currents to which Justice Holmes referred. 2 It is a
story whose plot has been rewritten with each change of the
political guard, enduring the subsequent ebb and flow of eco-
nomic support. The evolution of environmental law mirrors
* The author would like to thank Elizabeth and Michael Maher for their
unconditional support and encouragement. Thank you to Marni B. Belkin, her
editorial group, Professor Ralph Stein and Professor M. Stuart Madden for
their assistance in preparing this Comment for publication.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1881) [hereinaf-
ter HOLMES].
2. See HOLMES, supra note 1.
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the Nation's development and cognizance of industry's effects
on surrounding media. Society seeks to unify this environ-
mental awareness with legal justice through statutes and
regulations aimed to protect the environment.
Modern attempts to provide better environmental protec-
tion have emerged as legislation before the United States
Senate and House of Representatives. Recently, Senator
Frank R. Lautenberg co-sponsored the Environmental
Crimes and Enforcement Act of 19963 (ECEA) in the Senate
for consideration by the 105th Congress. The ECEA
originated in the Department of Justice through the involve-
ment of federal, state, and local prosecutors. 4 Drafted to
strengthen the government's power in enforcing environmen-
tal laws, the ECEA would establish significantly increased
penalties for environmental polluters.5
The ECEA "is aimed at bad actors who violate our envi-
ronmental laws purposely, intentionally, or with knowing
disregard for the impact of their actions. These are not peo-
ple who accidentally miss a deadline or even negligently for-
get to file for a needed permit."6 This legislation increases
penalties by providing for longer imprisonment terms and
higher monetary sanctions in both federal and state prosecu-
tions for those individuals who engage in the proscribed
conduct.7
The ECEA, if adopted, will have a pervasive effect on the
entire spectrum of environmental statutes, reflecting a legis-
lative effort to create more uniform enforcement and penalty
provisions.8 This bill creates liability for any person who vio-
3. S. 2096, 104th Cong. (1996).
4. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,033-04, 11,036 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996) (state-
ment of Sen. Lautenberg).
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 4 (1996).
8. Environmental statutes supplemented by the Environmental Crimes
and Enforcement Act are:
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) §§ 1-31, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y (1988); Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) §§ 1-412t, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2692 (1992); Federal Water Pollution Control Act ((commonly referred
to as the Clean Water Act) (CWA)) §§ 1-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1994); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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lates or even "attempts" to violate an environmental statute.9
"None of these proposals, by themselves, will solve the prob-
lem of environmental crime. But, together, they would make
a real difference." 10 This legislation enables federal and state
prosecutors to work together more effectively by creating a
State, Local, and Tribal Environmental Enforcement Train-
ing Program to instruct law enforcement personnel about in-
vestigation techniques.'1 Additionally, the proposed bill
extends the current statute of limitations for prosecution of
environmental statute violations.' 2
This Comment analyzes, in general, the ECEA. More
specifically, this Comment focuses on the ECEA's attempt
provision and its impact on the Clean Water Act (CWA), while
concentrating on the difficulty in establishing causation and
the requisite proof in obtaining a conviction. Further, it com-
pares the underlying rationales and social purposes of com-
mon law approaches to environmental law with the proposed
ECEA.
Part II provides a history of environmental law, discuss-
ing common law nuisance, trespass actions, and the philoso-
phy underpinning their utility in environmental suits. The
public policy underlying the common law foundation of envi-
ronmental law is described to compare it with the congres-
sional reasoning for the ECEA. Moreover, the progression of
environmental claims from a largely common law basis to de-
§ 1401 (1986); Act to Prevent Pollution From Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908;
Shore Protection Act of 1988, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2609, 2622-2623; Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f- 300j-26; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1976); Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-618q, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1990); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1986 &
Supp. IV 1994); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
1986 (EPCRKA) §§ 301-330, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1986); Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) §§ 102-603, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-85
(1976); Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 5-645
(1899).
9. See S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 7 (1996).
10. 142 CONG. REc. S11,033-04, 11,036 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Lautenberg).
11. See S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 5 (1996).
12. See id. § 6.
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pendence upon federal statutes is examined. Several cases
involving criminal and civil sanctions are explored to illus-
trate typical defenses raised in environmental crime cases.
The designation of the CWA as a public welfare statute will
be examined, in addition to the rule of lenity. The ECEA will
be contextually evaluated, focusing on its individual sections
and the supplementary historical information underlying the
Act's development. Attempt as it is defined in the Model Pe-
nal Code and other legal environments is applied to the bill in
order to demonstrate the possible legal obstacles the provi-
sion may present.
Part III compares the reasoning underlying the historical
development of environmental law in relation to the ECEA's
objectives to determine if the two can be harmonized. Supple-
mentary to this analysis is an application of the proposed at-
tempt amendment to applicable cases discussed in Part II,
serving as indicators of the amendment's possible pragmatic
successes and failures. Based on the reasoning provided in
these cases, the designation of the CWA as a public welfare
statute will be examined in relation to the bill's attempt
amendment. Further, the "knowingly" mens rea of applicable
CWA provisions will be evaluated in relation to its interpreta-
tion in other federal statutes. Finally, the ECEA's attempt
provision will be analyzed based on case law prescribing the
elements of attempt. A solution to the weaknesses of the at-
tempt provision is proffered, along with an analysis of the so-
cial effects of the attempt clause.
Part IV provides a conclusion summarizing both the posi-
tive and negative aspects of implementing the proposed bill,
illuminating its effects on the CWA. Additionally, the ration-
ale supporting why the CWA is not a public welfare statute is
summarized in relation to the ECEA's attempt provision.
II. Background
Justice Holmes' statement that in order to understand
what law is, we must know what it has been, is apropos in
discussing the historical development of environmental
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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law. 13 Today, environmental law is referred to as "an amal-
gam of common law and statutory principles. 1 4 Before envi-
ronmental statutes were enacted, aggrieved citizens relied on
the common law to abate environmentally offensive con-
duct. 15 Two principle causes of actions that address environ-
mental concerns have been, and continue to be, nuisance and
trespass.16 The common law causes of action may be utilized
individually or in conjunction with federal statutes. 17 How-
ever, federal and state statutes are more effective because
they address specific types of pollution and offer varied forms
of relief.'8 Environmental statutes, which are more compre-
hensive than common law actions, have reduced the need for
common law civil prosecutions. 19 "In those instances where
the environmental criminal statutes are not sufficient to re-
dress the offense, the modern prosecutor likely will employ
other more serious common law criminal statutes, which ap-
pear to be more specifically applicable and which offer greater
opportunities for deterrence than public nuisance."20
A. History of Environmental Law's Common Law Basis
The foundation of modern environmental law is derived
from nuisance. 21 Actions brought in nuisance have addressed
"virtually every major industrial and municipal activity
which is today the subject of comprehensive environmental
regulation - the operation of land fills, incinerators, sewage
treatment facilities, activities at chemical plants, aluminum,
13. See HOLMES, supra note 1.
14. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1 at 112 (2d ed.
1994) [hereinafter RODGERS].
15. See GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AND TOXIC TORTS 213 (1994).
16. See id.
17. See RODGERS, supra note 14.
18. See DONALD A. CARR ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
AVOIDING AND DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 5 (1995) [hereinafter CARR].
19. See John J. Gibson, Esq. & Richard M. Greenberg, Esq., Environmental
Crimes at Common Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 25, 34 (1995) [hereinafter
GIBSON].
20. Id.
21. See RODGERS, supra note 14.
1998] 739
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lead and copper smelters ... .,,22 There are two types of nui-
sance actions: public nuisance and private nuisance. Public
nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a general com-
munal right of the public. 23 Public nuisance actions may al-
lege harm to public health, exemplified by cases such as the
keeping of infectious cattle or maintaining a pond that breeds
malarial mosquitos. 24 Other public nuisance actions may in-
clude impediments with the public comfort, such as a ram-
pant circulation of malodors, or may include an interference
with the public convenience, such as the trammel of a public
highway or a navigable body of water.25 Some states have
codified the action of public nuisance while providing crimi-
nal penalties. 26 Remedies for public nuisance may include
damages and/or injunctive relief.27 Even though the birth of
the environmental movement was decades away, "the nui-
sance action was viewed as a vehicle for prosecuting
polluters."28
Representative early environmental cases included
claims based on foul odors emitted from a fat-processing facil-
ity 29 and noxious odors discharged from a pig farm.30 The in-
terference is considered unreasonable if "(1) the conduct
involved a significant interference with the public health, the
public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the pub-
lic convenience; or (2) the conduct was of a continuing nature
or produced permanent or long-lasting effect upon the public
right."31 A defendant in a public nuisance case is liable if his
"interference with the public right was intentional or unin-
tentional and otherwise actionable under the principles con-
trolling liability for negligent or reckless conduct or for
22. See RODGERS, supra note 14.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977).
24. See id. at cmt. b.
25. See id.
26. See id. at cmt. c.
27. See id. at cmt. i.
28. See GIBSON, supra note 19, at 29.
29. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 54 Mass. 365 (1847).
30. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 29 N.E. 656 (Ill. 1885).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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abnormally dangerous activities."32 To determine if an inter-
ference is significant, the court must balance the utility of the
harms and benefits33 of the questioned act.34 The common
law crime of public nuisance established a means by which
government could address and prevent degradation of the
environment.35
Private nuisance is a "nontrespassory invasion of an-
other's interests in the private use and enjoyment of his
land."36 A perpetrator of a private nuisance, similar to a de-
fendant in a public nuisance action, may be liable if the con-
duct is intentional or unintentional. 37 Private nuisance
actions, for example, have abated noxious odors emitted by a
feedlot 38 as well as secured damages caused by an air-pollut-
ing cement plant.39
Trespass is another common law action utilized to ad-
dress pollution. "One is subject to liability to another for tres-
pass irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any
legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally (a)
enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or
a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails
to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to
remove."40 The basic difference between trespass and nui-
sance is the requirement of an intentional invasion of the
plaintiffs possessory interest in trespass actions. Nuisance
actions, however, require a substantial unreasonable inter-
ference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of land.41
32. Id. at cmt. e.
33. "The utility of conduct was determined by identifying (1) social value
that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (2) suitability of
the conduct to the character of the locality; and (3) impracticability of prevent-
ing or avoiding the invasion." Id. at § 828.
34. See id. at § 827.
35. See GIBSON, supra note 19, at 27.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977).
37. See id. at § 822.
38. See Spur v. Del Webb, 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
39. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1977).
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B. The Rivers and Harbors Act as a Precursor to the CWA
As society became more concerned with environmental
harm, the common law approaches to redressing grievances
gave way to a codified approach addressing specific viola-
tions. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,42 also referred to
as the Refuse Act, was the precursor to the contemporary
CWA.43 "At first, the pressure favoring such regulation was
prompted, almost entirely, by the need to protect trade by
keeping national waterways and harbors free from obstruc-
tion." 44 While the Refuse Act was utilized to protect the navi-
gability of waters rather than to criminalize pollution, it
nevertheless signaled the genesis of public environmental
awareness.45 Even prior to the enactment of the CWA, the
Refuse Act became a potent tool for addressing environmen-
tal crimes.46
Federal enforcement agencies sought regulatory author-
ity independent of state or local enforcement agencies. 47 The
federal agencies therefore combined the infrequently used
Refuse Act with the investigatory capabilities of the grand
jury, and initiated prosecutions of water polluters. 48 This ap-
proach existed ". . . until Congress struck the balance mostly
(but not entirely) in favor of control at the source in the 1972
[Clean Water Act] Amendments." 49 The Refuse Act's capabil-
ity as an instrument to eliminate pollution nevertheless was
reflected in United States v. Republic Steel Corp..50 There,
42. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1899).
43. See CARR, supra note 18, at 194-95.
44. CHRISTOPHER HARRIS ET AL., 1 ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES § 1.07 at 1.11.12
(1995).
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel, 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
47. See CARR, supra note 18, at194.
48. See id.
49. See RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.1, at 252.
50. 362 U.S. 482 (1960). Republic Steel was based on a claim by the United
States to prevent steel companies from "depositing industrial solids in the
Calumet River ... without first obtaining a permit from the Chief of Engineers
of the Army" who had ordered the companies to remove the deposit of solids and
restore the channel's depth to twenty-one feet. Id. at 483. The defendant com-
panies operated mills along the Calumet River in their production of iron and
related products. See id. The companies captured the water for production pur-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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the Court found the deposit of industrial solids in a river to be
an "obstruction" of a navigable waterway. 51
Enacted in 1948, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (CWA)),5 2
premised its enforceability on state and local governments'
cooperation to satisfy federal water quality standards. 53 The
Refuse Act and the early version of the CWA "are schi-
zophrenic in conception, one espousing the water quality
standards5 4 approach, the other stressing effluent 55 limita-
poses and returned it polluted to the river through numerous sewers. See id.
The industrial waste created by the defendants usually accumulated in settling
basins; however, minuscule particles from the waste "flocculate[d] into larger
units... and deposited in the river bottom." Id. Although reports revealed that
the depth of the river in the defendants' mills vicinity had degenerated, the
defendants refused the Corps. of Engineers' order to dredge the river. See id.
The Court examined the Refuse Act, and more specifically, what type of mate-
rial constituted an obstruction as defined in the Act. See id. at 484. The Court
found the deposit to be an obstruction and then addressed the Court of Appeals'
determination that the Act provided no basis for injunctive relief. See id. at 491.
The Court stated that the United States had an "interest" to protect as stated in
§ 10 of the Refuse Act. See id. at 492. The Court stated that "Congress has
legislated and made its purpose clear; it has provided enough federal law in
§ 10 [of the Refuse Act] from which appropriate remedies may be fashioned
even though they rest on inferences." Id. at 492.
51. See 362 U.S. at 484. Section 10 of the Refuse Act states:
That the creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by
Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the
United States is hereby prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to
build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom,
weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port,
roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of
the United States, outside established harbor lines, or where no
harbor lines have been established, except on plans recommended
by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner
to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any
port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor of refuge, or in-
closure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any
navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been rec-
ommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secre-
tary of the Army prior to beginning the same.
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1899).
52. CWA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
53. See CARR, supra note 18, at 194.
54. [A water quality] standard shall consist of the designated uses of
the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for
such waters based upon such uses. Such standards shall be such as
9
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tions."56 Throughout the 1950s, however, public concern es-
calated regarding the country's water quality.5 7 By the
1960s, "isolation and autonomy of the state water pollution
control agencies gradually eroded as public concern with fed-
eral authority over water pollution grew."58 Therefore the
CWA was amended in 1965 to create federal water quality
standards that were to be enforced by state and local agencies
via negotiations and arbitrations.59 Progress in management
of pollution control subsequent to the amendments, however,
was unprolific. Presidential input addressed in Executive Or-
der No. 11,57460 established a program for the Corps of Engi-
neers to issue permits to point source dischargers in addition
to protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water
and serve the purpose of [the Clean Water Act]. Such standards
shall be established taking into consideration their use and value
for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recrea-
tional purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other purposes,
and also taking into consideration their use and value for
navigation.
CWA § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
55. The term 'effluent limitation' means any restriction established by
a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentra-
tions of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which
are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters
of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of
compliance.
CWA § 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11).
56. See RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.1, at 252.
57. See Carr, supra note 18, at 194.
58. JEFFREY MILLER & NANCY LONG, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw STATUTES 1996-97, 33.
59. See CARR, supra note 18, at 194.
60. 35 Fed. Reg. 19,627 (1970). The order states:
SECTION 1: The executive branch of the Federal Government
shall implement a permit program under the aforesaid section 13 of
the Act of March 3, 1899 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to
regulate the discharge of pollutants and other refuse matter into
the navigable waters of the United States or their tributaries and
the placing of such matter upon their banks.
SECTION 2: Responsibilities of Federal agencies.
(a)(1) The Secretary shall, after consultation with the Administra-
tor respecting water quality matters, issue and amend, as appropri-
ate, regulations, procedures, and instructions for receiving,
processing, and evaluating applications for permits pursuant to the
authority of the Act.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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to prescribing effluent guidelines developed by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA).61
C. 1972 CWA Amendments
In 1972, Congress amended the CWA and strengthened
the federal government's regulatory authority.62 The CWA
requires "industrial and municipal pollution sources to
achieve pollution reduction produced by use of specified levels
of control technology, where previously the strategy had been
based exclusively on requiring such sources to achieve pollu-
tion reduction necessary to meet specified levels of water
quality."63 The CWA authorizes the EPA Administrator to
issue technology-based effluent limitations64 in addition to
point source65 discharge permits. 66
(2) The Secretary shall be responsible for granting, denying, condi-
tioning, revoking, or spending Refuse Act permits. In so doing:
(A) He shall accept findings, determinations and interpretations
which the Administrator shall make respecting applicable water
quality standards and compliance with those standards in particu-
lar circumstances, including findings, determinations, and inter-
pretations arising from the Administrator's review of State or
interstate agency water quality certifications under section 21(b) of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (84 Stat. 108). A permit
shall be denied where the certification prescribed by section 21(b) of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act has been denied, or where
issuance would be inconsistent with any finding, determination, or
interpretation of the Administrator pertaining to applicable water
quality standards and considerations.
Id.
61. See id.
62. JEFFREY MILLER & NANCY LONG, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw STATUTES 1996-97, 141.
63. Id.
64. CWA § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b). See also supra note 55 and accompa-
nying text.
65. "The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, con-
duit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding
operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged." CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
66. See CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
11
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D. The Genesis of Criminal Liability in
Environmental Statutes
The EPA's administrative authority under the CWA has
been challenged by industry in various cases.6 7 In 1977, the
Sixth Circuit held that the CWA prohibited any discharge
without a permit regardless of proper dissemination of stan-
dards by the EPA.68 The penalties for violating the CWA
were only civil until the Amendments of 1972 were imple-
mented, thus broadening criminal liability. 69
In 1970, the amended Clean Air Act (CAA), marked the
beginning of contemporary law that provided criminal sanc-
tions for environmental crimes.70 The amendments embod-
ied congressional intent to provide rigorous sanctions for
polluters in order to deter purposeful violations.7 1 In 1990,
Congress enacted amendments to the CAA which "attempted
to remove all economic incentive for violation[s] by setting
fines ranging up to twice the gross pecuniary loss caused to a
third party or twice the gross pecuniary gain to the defend-
ant, whichever [was] greater."72 Stricter sentences for envi-
ronmental crimes became the legislative objective of both
citizen groups and concerned politicians as more comprehen-
sive regulations were developed.7 3 Ultimately, the courts ad-
ministered criminal penalties to environmental offenders.
For example, in U.S. v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc.,74 the defendant
67. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Train, 557 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1977) (explain-
ing that the steel company successfully challenged EPA's authority to object to
a NPDES permit issued by the Ohio EPA), vacated sub nom. Costle v. Republic
Steel Corp., 434 U.S. 909 (1978) (mem.), overruled by Republic Steel Corp. v.
Costle, 581 F.2d 1228 (1978). See also United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (holding that EPA has no authority to regulate discharges
to subsurface waters under the CWA).
68. See United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977).
69. See CARR, supra note 18, at 4.
70. See id. at 2.
71. See id. at 3.
72. Id. See also Clean Air Amendments of 1990, Pub.L.No. 101-549, § 70,
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 2399, 2675; 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (West. Supp. 1993).
73. See, e.g., Beartooth Alliance v. Crowne Butt Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168
(D. Mont. 1995); Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,
791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
74. 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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corporation and its operators were charged with violating the
CWA for discharging pollutants illegally. 75 Frezzo Brothers
Inc., was a Pennsylvania mushroom farming business that
produced compost for the cultivation of mushrooms. 76 Com-
posed of hay, horse manure, and water, the compost fer-
mented outside on wharves. 77 The individual defendants,
Guido and James Frezzo, were alleged to have "willfully dis-
charged manure into the storm water run-off system .... ,,78
The Frezzos were convicted of illegally discharging pollu-
tants without a permit and individually received thirty days
of imprisonment and fines totaling $50,000.79 The appellants
argued that, under the CWA, the EPA "must either give them
some notice of alleged violations ..., or institute a civil action
before pursuing criminal remedies under the Act."80 The
court, however, stated that "[t]here is nothing in the text of
[the Act]8 1 that compels the conclusion that prior written no-
tice, other than administrative or civil remedies are prerequi-
site to criminal proceedings under the Act."8 2 The court
rejected the defendants' argument that the government
should have procured civil sanctions prior to implementing a
suit for criminal sanctions and stated that:
[alithough continued discharges after notification could be
one way for the Government to prove scienter, it is cer-





79. See 602 F.2d at 1124.
80. Id. at 1125-26.
81. The court, more specifically was referring to § 1319(c), which states:
Any person who - (A) negligently violates section 1311, 1312,
1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328 or 1345 of this title, or any per-
mit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a
permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator
or by a State, or any requirement imposed in a pretreatment pro-
gram approved under section 1342(a)(3) or 1342(b)(8) of this title or
in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by the Secretary
of the Army or by a State ....
CWA § 309(c)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A).
82. 602 F.2d at 1126.
19981 747
13
748 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
Government could logically argue ... that the circum-
stances surrounding the alleged discharges manifested
willful violations of the Act and that it had the power to
pursue criminal rather than civil sanctions.8 3
E. Penalties in Environmental Statutes
Civil penalties for conventional environmental violations
generally are fines and/or injunctions.8 4 A more serious pen-
alty, also found in the CWA, is the determination that compa-
nies and individuals convicted of violations are banned from
participating in or receiving contracts from the government.85
Another example of civil penalties is found in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),86 which imposes
fines of up to $50,000 for each day of each violation by a per-
son who transports hazardous waste.8 7
An example of civil penalty imposition is highlighted in
Beartooth Alliance v. Crowne Butt Mines.88 The case involved
several environmental groups' demand for injunctive and de-
claratory relief, in addition to civil penalties for defendants'
unpermitted pollutant discharge into surrounding bodies of
water.8 9 The court stated that the citizen groups would have
to "prove that defendants (1) discharged or added 90 (2) a pol-
83. 602 F.2d at 1126-27.
84. See, e.g., CWA § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
85. CWA § 508(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a).
No Federal agency may enter into any contract with any person,
who has been convicted of any offense under section 1319(c) of this
title, for the procurement of goods, materials, and services if such
contract is to be performed at any facility at which the violation
which gave rise to such convictions occurred, and if such facility is
owned, leased, or supervised by such person. The prohibition in the
preceding sentence shall continue until the Administrator certifies
that the condition giving rise to such conviction has been corrected.
Id.
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1976).
87. RCRA § 3008(d)(1)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (d)(1)(2).
88. 904 F. Supp. 1168 (D. Mont.1995).
89. See id. at 1170.
90.
The term 'discharge of a pollutant' and the term 'discharge of pollu-
tants' each means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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lutant9 l (3) to navigable waters92 (4) from a point source (5)
without a permit."9 3 The court held that the acid mine drain-
age, which consisted of copper and zinc, constituted a pollu-
tant as defined in the CWA.94 The defendants claimed that
the acid mine drainage existed in that area due to "naturally
occurring conditions which predate any historic mining activ-
ities."95 The court rejected the defendants' argument based
on the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the CWA, stating,
"any reliance on historical pollution to evade current liability
misapprehends the focus of the [CWA]."96 The court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs proved that the defendants illegally
discharged into navigable waters without a permit and were
thus subject to civil penalties.97
The objective of environmental penalties is to deter po-
tential polluters from engaging in illegal conduct.98 In recent
years, federal prosecutions for environmental crimes have
continuously increased. 99 "Unlike common law criminal of-
fenses that prohibit specific acts, environmental statutes
often provide for criminal penalties for any violation of regu-
lations."10 0 Regulated companies are often in compliance with
environmental statutes due to the fear of being convicted of a
criminal violation, along with the possibility of incurring sub-
the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point
source other than a vessel or other floating craft.
CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
91. 904 F. Supp. at 1172. "A pollutant means dredged spoil, solid waste,
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage, sludge, munitions, chemical
wastes, biological material, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded
equipment, sand, cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste
discharged into the water." CWA § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
92. "The term 'navigable waters' means the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas." CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
93. 904 F. Supp. at 1172.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1173.
97. See id.
98. See CARR, supra note 18, at 5.
99. See Michael S. Elder, Esq., Federal Enforcement Programs, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL CRIMES 1, 3-4 (1995) [hereinafter ELDER].
100. Benjamin S. Sharp, Environmental Enforcement Excesses: Over
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stantial fines, imprisonment of officers or employees, and loss
of government contracts.10 Some scholars, however, suggest
that prosecutorial discretion may be abused under the
CWA.10 2 Discussed below are several examples of the arche-
typical claims, defenses, and penalties raised in environmen-
tal crimes litigation.
F. Representative Environmental Crime Cases
In Unites States v. Strandquist,10 3 a marina manager
was convicted of illegally discharging raw sewage generated
by the marina into navigable waters.'0 4 In attempting to re-
move sewage when the tanks of the marina were full, Strand-
quist and his employees "frequently dumped the sewage from
the sewage truck into a storm grate .... ,"105 Strandquist was
found guilty of violating CWA § 301(a) 10 6 and § 309(c)(2). 10 7
101. See Testimony of Roger Clegg regarding H.R. 5305, The Environmental
Crimes Act of 1992, before the House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal
Justice (June 11, 1992).
102. See Benjamin S. Sharp, Environmental Enforcement Excesses: Over
Criminalization and Too Severe Punishment, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,658, 10,659
(1991).
103. 993 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1993).
104. Id. at 395.
105. Id. at 397.
106. "Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316,
1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful." CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
107. The cited section enhances the punishment for "knowingly" violating
the Clean Water Act:
Any person who - (A) knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316,
1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any permit con-
dition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit
issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator or by a
State, or any requirement imposed in a pretreatment program ap-
proved under section 1342(a)(3) or 1342(b)(8) of this title or in a
permit issued under section 1344 of this title by the Secretary of the
Army or by a State; or (B) knowingly introduces into a sewer sys-
tem or into a publicly owned treatment works any pollutant or haz-
ardous substance which such person knew or reasonably should
have known could cause personal injury or property damage or,
other than in compliance with all applicable Federal, State, or local
requirements or permits, which causes such treatment works to vi-
olate any effluent limitation or condition in a permit issued to the
treatment works under section 1342 of this title by the Administra-
tor or a State; shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000.00
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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The defendant received a five-month imprisonment for each
count and a subsequent one-year supervised release, which
included five months of home detention.'0 8 Strandquist ap-
pealed his conviction, contending (1) that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to prove that he discharged pollutants into
navigable waters; and (2) that the penalties under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 10 9 as applied to his case, contradicted
congressional intent.110
More specifically, Strandquist argued that the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines failed to distinguish varying levels of serious-
ness among different environmental statutes, and that "as a
result, prison terms will be imposed on virtually all environ-
mental offenders, be they first or repeat offenders.""1 The
court affirmed Strandquist's conviction despite his argument
"that the Sentencing Guidelines for environmental offenses,
in particular U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3 for the mishandling of environ-
mental pollutants, as applied to the instant case, exceed[ed]
the authority granted to the Sentencing Commission...." 112
The court stated that "through the [CWA] and other environ-
mental laws, Congress has determined that harm to the envi-
ronment-even absent imminent threats to public health,
welfare, or safety-is a public policy concern of the greatest
magnitude.' 13 The court continued to state that "Congress
itself emphasized the importance and seriousness of its envi-
nor more than $50,000.00 per day of violation, or by imprisonment
for not more than 3 years, or by both. If a conviction of a person is
for a violation committed after a first conviction of such person
under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more
than $100,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more
than 6 years, or by both.
CWA § 309(c)(2)(A) & (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) & (B) (emphasis added).
108. See 993 F.2d at 398.
109. Congress created a Sentencing Commission to devise uniform and ap-
propriate sentencing practices for federal crimes. "The vehicle adopted to ac-
complish this objective was a detailed set of guidelines that establish
appropriate sentences under given circumstances for most federal crimes." See
CARR, supra note 18, at 328.
110. See 993 F.2d at 398.
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ronmental goals by creating severe penalties-both fines and
imprisonment-for willful violations of the [CWA]."114
In United States v. Boldt,115 an Astro Circuit Corporation
manager was convicted of violating the CWA because he au-
thorized illegal discharges into a sewer system. 116 Astro used
an electroplating process to manufacture printed circuit
boards1 17 and was required under the CWA to "pretreat [its]
industrial waste in order to remove toxic metals such as cop-
per before discharging that waste into a city sewer sys-
tem."118 Astro's pretreatment system consisted of a "flow
system designed to treat 45 gallons per minute of waste-
water," but was "handling approximately 90 gallons per min-
ute ...... ,19 When the system was unable to accommodate all
of the wastewater, the company discharged the water "di-
rectly into the city sewer. 1 20 On two occasions, Boldt "know-
ingly" allowed untreated water to be discharged into the city's
sewer system. 21 The first instance involved a bypass,122
which caused the "copper level in Astro's effluent [to] ex-
ceed[ I the federal regulation by nearly four times [the per-
mitted amount]."123 Boldt was allegedly aware of the bypass
and did not attempt to prevent it.124 The City of Lowell
alerted Astro of the violation and Boldt's answer alleged that
a failure of two pumps caused a serious flood.125 Boldt stated
that "[iin order to remove the floodwaters so as to protect
electrical equipment and controls and permit maintenance
access, it was necessary to transfer the[] wastewaters into
the treatment systems at a higher-than-normal rate."1 26 The
114. Id. (citing United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 1992)).
115. 929 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).




120. 929 F.2d at 37.
121. See id. at 37-38.
122. Bypass is the "intentional diversion of waste streams from any portion
of a treatment facility." 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(m)(1)(i) (1994).
123. 929 F.2d at 37-38.





city claimed Boldt's statement was "misleading and false in
that it failed to mention the almost daily bypassing of the
pretreatment system at Astro, nor did it mention that the
company had consistently found high amounts of copper in its
effluent."127
The second alleged discharge was caused by clogged lines
that were supposed to deliver caustic solution to a treatment
tank.128 Subsequent to an unsuccessful manual attempt to
add the caustic solution to the tank, Boldt ordered an em-
ployee to "dump the... 3,100 gallons of partially treated was-
tewater [] into the city sewer."1 29 Boldt was convicted of a
one-day committed sentence on each count.130
In United States v. Weitzenhoff,13' a manager and an as-
sistant of a community services sewage treatment plant were
convicted of violating the CWA § 1319 (c)(2).132 Weitzenhoff
managed an East Honolulu plant which was "designed to
treat [nearly] 4 million gallons of residential wastewater each
day by removing the solids and other harmful pollutants from
the sewage so that the resulting effluent [could] be safely dis-
charged into the ocean."1 33 The plant generated waste-acti-
vated sludge that the defendants usually had removed to
another treatment plant. 34 At one point "improvements
were made to the ... plant and the hauling was discontin-
ued."135 Therefore, waste-activated sludge began to build up
in the plant. The defendants instructed employees to "dis-
pose of it on a regular basis by pumping it from the storage
tanks directly into the .. .ocean."' 36 The waste-activated
sludge "thereby bypassed the plant's effluent sampler so that
the samples taken and reported to Hawaii's Department of
127. Id.
128. See 929 F.2d at 38.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 42.
131. 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) amended by 35 F.3d 1275 (9' Cir. 1994).
132. See supra note 107.
133. 1 F.3d at1527.
134. See id. at 1527-28.
135. Id.
136. 1 F.3d at 1528.
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Health and the EPA did not reflect its discharge." 13 7 The dis-
charge from April 1988 to June 1989 amounted to "436,000
pounds of pollutant solids being discharged into the ocean"
and "violated the plant's 30-day average effluent limit under
the permit for most of the months during which they oc-
curred."138 The managers were found guilty of six out of
thirty-one charges of violating the CWA. 139 Weitzenhoff, sen-
tenced to twenty-one months of imprisonment, filed an ap-
peal contesting the court's interpretation of "knowingly" as
found in the CWA.140
The court analyzed congressional intent and the legisla-
tive history of the CWA to determine what constituted "know-
ingly." The court stated:
Because they speak in terms of 'causing' a violation, the
congressional explanations of the new penalty provisions
strongly suggest that criminal sanctions are to be imposed
on an individual who knowingly engages in conduct that
results in a permit violation, regardless of whether the pol-
luter is cognizant of the requirements or even the existence
of the permit. 141
The court stated that the CWA is a public welfare statute 42
and therefore, the "knowingly" component did not refer to the
legal violation, but to the act itself.143 "The criminal provi-
sions of the CWA are clearly designed to protect the public at
large from the potentially dire consequences of water pollu-
tion, and as such fall within the category of public welfare
legislation."14 4 Subsequently, the court held that the govern-





141. 1 F.3d at 1529.
142. See id. "Many of [the public welfare] offenses are not in the nature of
positive aggressions or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt,
but are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where
it imposes a duty." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952).
143. 1 F.3d at 1529.




their acts violated the permit or the CWA." 14 6 The defend-
ants additionally argued that "their dumping of. . . toxic
sludge into the ocean ... was an effort to restore the plant's
biological balance so as to avoid a complete plant shutdown
and avert environmental disaster."147 The defendants ar-
gued that the discharges should be construed as bypasses al-
lowed by their permit. 48 However, "[ulnder the permit,
bypass is generally prohibited, except to 'prevent loss of life,
personal injury, or severe property damage' and in the ab-
sence of feasible alternatives." 149 The court held that the dis-
charges were not "permissible bypasses because they were
not for essential maintenance to assure efficient opera-
tion."' 50 The defendants' criminal convictions, therefore,
were affirmed. 151
In United States v. Hopkins,152 the defendant assumed
corporate responsibility for CWA compliance for a corporation
that manufactured metal shims and fasteners. 153 The manu-
facturer discharged water containing excessive amounts of
toxic materials, including zinc, into a Connecticut river. 54
The manufacturer signed a consent order with the State of
Connecticut's Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP), "requiring Spirol to pay a $30,000 fine for past zinc-
related discharge violations and to comply in the future with
discharge limitations specified in the order."155 Two years
subsequent to the decree, the "DEP issued a modified 'waste-
[P]ublic welfare [statutes] ... impose a form of strict criminal liabil-
ity through statutes that do not require the defendant to know the
facts that make his conduct illegal. In construing such statutes, we
have inferred from silence that Congress did not intend to require
proof of mens rea to establish an offense ....
United States v. Staples, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994).
146. 1 F.3d at 1530.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1531 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 1532 (citations omitted).
151. Id.
152. 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995).
153. See id. at 534-35.
154. See id. at 534.
155. Id. at 535.
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water discharge permit' . . . imposing more restrictive limits
on the quantity of zinc and other substances that Spirol was
permitted to release into the river."156
Hopkins, Spirol's vice-president for manufacturing, was
charged with "deliberately tamper[ing] with Spirol's waste-
water testing and falsify[ing] its reports to DEP."15 7 Spirol,
in compliance with its permit, was supposed to "collect a sam-
ple of its wastewater and send it to an independent labora-
tory every week and report the laboratory results to DEP in a
discharge monitoring report once a month."158 Two Spirol
employees testified that prior to the samples being sent to the
laboratory, Hopkins determined if a new sample was to be
taken the next day.' 59 If the sample taken the next day also
exceeded the permit limitations, Hopkins ordered the em-
ployees to "dilute [it] ... with tap water or to reduce the zinc
concentration using an ordinary coffee filter." 60 One of the
employees testified "that in some of the samples submitted to
the laboratory, there was more tap water than waste-
water,"' 6 1 and that "the samples had been tampered with
about 40 percent of the time."1 62
Hopkins was alleged to have "(1) ... knowingly falsified
or tampered with Spirol's discharge sampling methods... ;
(2)... knowingly violated the conditions of the DEP permit,
in violation of the CWA ... ; and (3) ... conspired to commit
these offenses." 63 Hopkins was convicted of all three charges
and sentenced. 64 On his appeal, Hopkins alleged that the
jury was erroneously instructed of the "knowingly" element
because it needed to be proven that "he knew he was acting in
violation of the CWA or the DEP permit."165 Citing to con-
gressional intent in developing the CWA, the court stated, "in
156. Id.





162. 53 F.3d at 536 (citations omitted).
163. Id.




construing knowledge elements that appear in so-called 'pub-
lic welfare' statutes ... the Supreme Court has inferred that
Congress did not intend to require proof that the defendant
knew his actions were unlawful."'166 The court also stated
that since a government permit was issued regarding dis-
charge limitations, the defendant should have had increased
awareness of there being a regulation. 167 Additionally, the
court stated that the kind of pollutants the CWA refers to "are
of the type that would alert any ordinary user to the likeli-
hood of stringent regulation[s]. " 168 The court addressed the
fact that the mens rea required under CWA § 1319 (c)(2)(A)
was reduced from "willfully" to "knowingly" during the for-
mulation of amendments, and thereby indicated that "Con-
gress intended not to require proof that the defendant knew
his conduct violated the law or a regulatory permit." 69 The
court concluded that "the government was required to prove
that Hopkins knew the nature of his acts and performed
them intentionally, but was not required to prove that he
knew that those acts violated the CWA, or any particular pro-
vision of that law, or the regulatory permit issued to
Spirol."' 70
The court employed an analysis similar to that applied in
Weitzenhoff, by relying on United States v. International
Minerals & Chemical Corporation,'7' to establish the appro-
priate mens rea application. In International Minerals, the
Court addressed the issue of what constituted "knowingly" in
an environmental regulation. 172 The defendant was alleged
to have violated the Transportation and Explosives Act
(TEA)173 by failing to accurately reveal in required shipping
papers the contents of an interstate shipment of acids. 174
The government charged the defendant with "knowingly" vio-
166. Id.
167. See id. at 539.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 540.
170. Id. at 541.
171. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
172. See id.
173. 18 U.S.C. §§ 831-837 (1994).
174. 402 U.S. at 559.
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lating the TEA.175 The Court stated that the government
only had to prove that the defendant knew he was shipping
substances that he knew were hazardous materials; it was
not required to prove that the defendant knew of the TEA, of
which he was allegedly violating. 176
The rule of lenity, had it been applied in the Interna-
tional Minerals case, may have altered the outcome. The rule
of lenity requires courts to strictly construe ambiguous statu-
tory and regulatory provisions in a manner most favorable to
defendants.177 In several environmental crime cases involv-
ing the CWA, the courts have presumed a defendant's intent,
rather than applying the rule of lenity. 178 The courts' pre-
sumption of a defendant's intent emerges from those courts'
deeming the CWA a public welfare statute. 179 The Interna-
tional Minerals case inferred that the rule of lenity was not
applicable "to resolve ambiguity in statutes intended to pro-
tect human health and the environment." 80 Therefore, in
the jurisdictions where the CWA is designated as a public
welfare statute, the rule of lenity usually is not applied.' 81
However, in a recent case, United States v. Plaza Health Lab-
oratories, Inc.,182 the Second Circuit, recognizing that several
provisions in the CWA were ambiguous, 8 3 applied the rule of
lenity in resolving an alleged violation of the CWA.184
Illustrative of the harmonization of the rule of lenity
with a public welfare statute is the analysis in Liparota v.
175. See id. at 559.
176. See id. at 563-64.
177. See CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 12, at 59-60 (14th
ed. 1978).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993)
amended by 1 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533
(2d Cir. 1995).
179. See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) amended
by 1 F.3d 1275 (9t" Cir. 1994); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir.
1995).
180. David E. Filippi, Unleashing the Rule of Lenity: Environmental Enforc-
ers Beware!, 26 ENvL. L. 923, 936 (1996).
181. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
182. 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993).
183. See id. The court analyzed CWA §§ 309(c)(2)-(3), 502 (14), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1319(c)(2)-(3), 1362 (14).
184. 3 F.3d at 649.
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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United States. 8 5 Although the case involved an alleged
knowing violation of the Food Stamp Act,18 6 the Court
"hinted... that the rule of lenity may be improper to resolve
lingering ambiguities in environmental statutes."'8 7 The
Court established a test to determine what constituted a pub-
lic welfare offense.' 8 The Court stated that such an offense
is "a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is
subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously
threaten the community's health or safety.' 8 9
There are two distinct classifications of public welfare
statutes. The first classification consists of statutes in which
mens rea in the statutory language has been intentionally
omitted by Congress.190 The second classification involves
statutes in which mens rea is included in the language, but
the courts construe only the intended prohibited activity to be
modified by the mens rea terminology. 191 Pursuant to this
second classification, a person may be convicted of engaging
in an activity even though he was unaware of the statute reg-
ulating the conduct.192 The second approach as applied to the
CWA has been adopted by a few courts, yet vehemently re-
jected by others. 193 In Morissette v. United States, 94 the
Court examined the elements required to classify a statute as
a public welfare statute. The Court stated:
Many violations of such [public welfare] regulations result
in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but
merely create the danger or probability of it which the law
185. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
186. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2032 (1994).
187. David E. Filippi, Unleashing the Rule of Lenity: Environmental Enforc-
ers Beware!, 26 ENVTL. L. 923, 937 (1996).
188. 471 U.S. at 433.
189. Id.
190. Kevin Phillip Cichetti, United States v. Weitzenhoff: Reading Out the
Knowingly From Knowingly Violates in the Clean Water Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(2)(A), 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1183, 1190 (1996).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Compare United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993)
amended by 1 F.3d 1275 (9' Cir. 1994) with United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d
386 (5th Cir. 1996).
194. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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seeks to minimize .... Hence, legislation applicable to
such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent
as a necessary element .... [Plenalties . . . are relatively
small, and conviction does not grave damage to an of-
fender's reputation.195
It still remains, however, that the defendant who violates a
public welfare statute must know that his conduct may "seri-
ously threaten the community's health or safety."196 For ex-
ample, in Staples v. United States,197 the Court stated that,
"we essentially have relied on the nature of the statute and
the particular character of the items regulated to determine
whether congressional silence concerning the mental element
of the offense should be interpreted as dispensing with con-
ventional mens rea requirements." 98 The Court determined
that unless Congress has stated that a mens rea is not re-
quired for a particular regulation, courts should not "apply
the public welfare offense . . . as dispensing with mens
rea."' 99 Additionally, the Court stated that by interpreting
public welfare offenses to require, minimally, that the de-
fendant know he is handling a hazardous substance, the
Court has avoided construing criminal regulations to impose
a stringent form of strict liability in interpreting public wel-
fare offenses. 200
In United States v. Ahmad,20 the defendant was con-
victed by the lower court of "knowingly" discharging a pollu-
tant into navigable waters. Ahmad, owner of a combination
convenience store/gas station, discovered that one of the gaso-
line tanks contained a leak.20 2 The leak allowed for water to
enter the tank, but did not permit gasoline to seep out, so
Ahmad did not consider it to be a hazard.20 3 Gasoline was
195. Id. at 256.
196. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985).
197. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
198. Id. at 607.
199. Id. at 618.
200. See id. at 607 n.3.
201. 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996).




pumped from the bottom of the tank where the water had set-
tled, thereby forcing Ahmad to remedy the leak in order to
continue dispensing gasoline. 20 4 Despite an environmental
testing company's recommendation that it remove the 800
gallons of water from the tank, Ahmad decided to procure the
removal himself.20 5 Ahmad rented a motorized water pump
and discharged the water-gasoline mixture into a manhole,
resulting in contamination of a nearby creek and the city's
sewage system.20 6 Ahmad alleged that he did not "know-
ingly" discharge the gasoline because he was not present at
the removal process the entire time; however, he admitted
that he negligently left possession of the pump to his employ-
ees. 207 Ahmad also maintained that he thought he was sim-
ply discharging water and not gasoline. 208
Ahmad contended that the government had to prove he
"knowingly" acted upon each element of the offenses with
which he was charged. 20 9 The court, stating that "[t]he lan-
guage of the CWA is less than pellucid,"210 reversed Ahmad's
conviction and remanded the case for another trial.211 The
court stated that the "principal issue is to which elements of
the offense the modifier 'knowingly' applies."212 Citing to the
first judicial pronouncement that "statutory crimes carrying
severe penalties are presumed to require that a defendant
know the facts that make his conduct illegal,"21 3 the court
held that in order to convict Ahmad, it must be proven that
he "knowingly" violated each element of the provisions under
which he was charged.214
204. See id. at 387-88.
205. See id. at 388.
206. 101 F.3d at 388.
207. See id. at 389.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 389.
211. See 101 F.3d at 393.
212. Id. at 390.
213. Id. (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619-20 (1994)).
214. Id. at 390.
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In contrast to the holdings in United States v. Hopkins215
and United States v. Weitzenhoff,21 6 the Ahmad court focused
on the statutory construction of the CWA and whether the
"knowingly" requirement of the CWA falls within the designa-
tion of a public welfare offense.21 7 The court noted that "the
public welfare exception is narrow"218 and outlined the test
as being whether "dispensing with mens rea would require
the defendant to have knowledge only of traditionally lawful
conduct."219 The violations "of which Ahmad was convicted
have precisely this characteristic, for if knowledge is not re-
quired as to the nature of the substance discharged, one who
honestly and reasonably believes he is discharging water may
be himself guilty of a felony if the substance turns out to be
something else. '220 The court held that the elements of CWA
§ 1319(c)(2)(a) 221 do not constitute public welfare offenses be-
cause (1) public welfare offenses "have virtually always been
crimes punishable by relatively light penalties such as fines
or short jail sentences rather than substantial terms of im-
prisonment";222 and (2) the knowing violations of the CWA re-
quire a knowing mens rea of each element of the offense. 223
In some instances, convictions are vacated because of the
environmental statute's inapplicability to the facts of the
case. In United States v. Borowski,224 the defendant was
president of a manufacturing facility that produced "optical
mirrors for use in aerospace guidance and sighting sys-
tems."225 The facility used multiple rinses and dips to "plate
nickel onto its mirrors."226 The liquids from the baths were
disposed of into plating room sinks which drained into under-
215. 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995).
216. 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) amended by 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994).
217. 101 F.3d at 390-91.
218. Id. at 391.
219. Id. (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994)).
220. Id. at 391.
221. See supra note 107.
222. 101 F.3d at 391, construed in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600
(1994).
223. 101 F.3d at 390.
224. 977 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1992).




ground pipes that ultimately fed into the Massachusetts
Water Resource Authority's treatment works. 227 "[Since] the
pollutants were ultimately discharged into a publicly-owned
treatment works, [the facility] was subject to the EPA's pre-
treatment regulations."228 The manufacturing plant's dis-
charge significantly exceeded the applicable pretreatment
standards.229 The nickel and nitric acid discharges from the
facility were sufficient to raise major health concerns. 230 In
addition, the plant's employees were told to scrape and dis-
pose of the harmful solutions by hand in discharging the sub-
stances. 23 1 The defendant was aware of the harmful effects of
nickel and nitric acid because in addition to his receiving in-
formation from suppliers regarding the chemicals' dangers,
the chemical containers included warnings. 232 The defendant
was indicted for violating the knowing endangerment felony
provision of the CWA.23 3 The court vacated the defendant's
conviction because it concluded that "a knowing endanger-
ment prosecution cannot be premised upon danger that oc-






232. See id. at 29.
233.
Any person who knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1313,
1316,1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any per-
mit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a
permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator
or by a State, . . . and who knows at that time that he thereby
places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bod-
ily injury, shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more
than $250,000 or imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both.
A person which is an organization shall, upon conviction of violat-
ing this subparagraph, be subject to a fine of not more than
$1,000,000. If a conviction of a person is for a violation committed
after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, the
maximum punishment shall be doubled with respect to both fine
and imprisonment.
CWA § 309(c)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(3)(A).
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treatment works. The provision, therefore does not apply to
the defendants' conduct."234
G. Federal Enforcement of Environmental Crimes
As demonstrated by the discussion of criminal environ-
mental cases, the penalties imposed on defendants are often
disputed. New regulations and governmental departments
have been created to address environmental crimes in order
to produce impervious cases against environmental
criminals. Unfortunately, "[the] growth in environmental
criminal law has generated considerable commentary, raising
questions as to whether the expanding environmental law vi-
olates norms of fairness to the targets of prosecution, whether
the laws 'over-deter,' and whether the Department of Justice
and its U.S. Attorneys throughout the country are adminis-
tering the new laws soundly."235
At the federal level, the Department of Justice's Environ-
mental Crimes Section and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices are re-
sponsible for investigating and prosecuting environmental
crimes. 236 Additionally, the Department of Justice also con-
tributed resources and training to the U.S. Attorneys' Of-
fices.237 "Between October 1, 1987 and May 31, 1993, the
Environmental Crimes Section and U.S. [A]ttorneys' [O]ffices
handled cases against 630 defendants, achieving a conviction
rate of 91.1 percent. More than one-third of all individual
defendants received prison terms."238
Consequently, the EPA implemented a Criminal En-
forcement Program. Since the Criminal Enforcement Pro-
gram's creation in 1982, through 1992, federal prosecutors
indicted 911 corporations and individuals for environmental
234. 977 F.2d at 32.
235. Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the
Development of Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MAY L. REV.
251, 252 (1993).





crimes. 239 Over two-thirds of the indictments resulted in
guilty pleas and convictions.240 Jail time for the convictions
amounted to over 388 years, of which 191 years were
served. 241 Additionally, federal courts imposed criminal fines
amounting to over $ 333 million. 242 The EPA published its
Enforcement Accomplishments Report disclosing two criteria
to predicate an environmental case for criminal enforcement:
(1) significant environmental harm; and (2) culpable
conduct. 24 3
Unfortunately, "federal efforts to introduce criminal
sanctions into the existing noncriminal regulatory scheme
have encountered significant impediments." 244 For example,
inadequate staffing may cause EPA personnel to prematurely
refer cases to the Department of Justice.245 Thus, the De-
partment of Justice may not prosecute the cases vigor-
ously.246 Additionally, the legal approaches favored by the
EPA's staff which is "comprised of scientists, administrators,
and attorneys" compared with the "criminal government law-
yers" may foster tension that undermines successfully prose-
cuting environmental crimes cases.247 Roger J. Marzulla, of
the Resources Division of the Department of Justice, in testi-
mony before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives, stated that "the environmental enforcement
program has not yet adjusted to the reality that most compa-
nies comply with most major environmental regulations al-
239. Testimony of Roger Clegg regarding H.R. 5305, the Environmental
Crimes Act of 1992, before the House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal




243. See ELDER, supra note 99, at 5.
244. Theodora Galacatos, The United States Department of Justice Environ-
mental Crimes Section: A Case Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict Over
Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 FORD-
HLAM L. REV. 587, 601 (1995).
245. See id.
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most all of the time."248 Marzulla contended that since most
companies comply with environmental regulations, the envi-
ronmental enforcement divisions are forced to bring "margi-
nal cases" and attempt to attach major penalties to them.249
Marzulla advocated a more prudent approach to bringing en-
vironmental crime cases.250 He claimed the foundation of the
problem to be the "fact that the EPA and the Justice Depart-
ment measure the success of the environmental enforcement
program not on the basis of environmental improvements
made, but rather on the number of convictions and the size of
penalties obtained."251 Additionally, Marzulla stated "[tihe
plain fact is, that as long as success is measured in numbers
of cases filed and penalties obtained, we will continue to see
the waste and heartache of unnecessary and unjustified envi-
ronmental prosecutions . . "252
H. The ECEA
The ECEA, in some aspects may be an answer to the in-
teragency controversies because it fosters cooperative ap-
proaches to environmental crimes. The bill was introduced in
the U.S. Senate by Senator Lautenberg. 253 It is an attempt
not only to create better environmental protections, but also
to level the playing field for companies that are in continuous
compliance with environmental statutes. 254 "Expenditures of
environmental controls are a cost of business that, in the
short run, can adversely affect a company's bottom line."255
Companies that do not comply with, or blatantly disregard
environmental laws, enjoy a competitive advantage and pos-
248. Commercial and Administrative Law: Hearings on Regulatory Warning,
Before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives Subcommittee
(1996) (statement of Roger J. Marzulla).
249. See id. "Examination of the environmental enforcement docket dis-
closes far too many cases in which actual environmental injury (or even the




253. See S. 2096, 104th Cong. (1996).
254. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,033-04, 11,036 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996) (state-




sible economic dominance over companies that spend capital
for compliance with environmental regulations. 256 Advocates
of the bill assert that "when a business invests in environ-
mental protection to comply with [the] laws, it should not be
placed at a competitive disadvantage as a result."25 7 The bill
does not address companies that have inadvertently or acci-
dentally violated the laws; it is aimed at "criminals who know
what they're doing, and who generally are flouting [the] laws
simply to make a buck."258
The bill contains nine sections as well as a section-by-
section analysis. Section 2 of the bill simply states Congress'
finding that because the federal prosecution of violators of en-
vironmental crimes is a vital role in protecting human health,
public safety, and the environment, further legislation is re-
quired.25 9 The stated purpose of the "legislation is to increase
protection by strengthening Federal law enforcement and by
increasing the effectiveness of joint Federal, State, local, and
tribunal criminal environmental enforcement efforts."260 The
third section of the bill allows for a party convicted of violat-
ing an environmental statute to be ordered to reimburse
states, localities, and tribes for the costs of investigation and
prosecution of the crime the party committed.261 The purpose




259. See S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996). Congress finds that-
(1) Federal investigation and prosecution of environmental crimes
play a critical role in the protection of human health, public safety,
and the environment;
(2) the effectiveness of environmental criminal enforcement ef-
forts is greatly strengthened by close cooperation and coordination
among Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities; and
(3) legislation is needed to facilitate Federal investigation and
prosecution of environmental crimes and to increase the effective-
ness of joint Federal, State, local, and tribal criminal enforcement
efforts.
Id.
260. 142 CONG. REc. S11,033-04, 11,038 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Lautenberg).
261. See S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996).
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local, and tribal units.262 Often the non-federal enforcement
units initiate an investigation and continue assisting their
federal counterparts throughout the trial of a violator.263 The
cost of this assistance, if the bill is approved, will be reim-
bursed if a federal court orders the violator to pay for all costs
incurred for the pollution it discharged. 264 Since a federal
court may "order reimbursement only upon the motion of the
United States, the discretion of both the Federal prosecutor
and the court will serve as a check against unwarranted cost
awards."265 The reimbursement would be designated for en-
vironmental law enforcement use and made payable directly
to the state or local government. 266
An important provision of the bill creates a twenty-year
maximum prison term and/or a maximum fine of $500,000 for
any person, who, in committing an environmental crime,
causes serious bodily injury or the death of any other per-
son.267 If the violator is a corporation, a two million dollar
fine is imposed.268 The drafters of the bill cited that "[p]olice
262. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,033-04, 11,038 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996) (state-
ment of Sen. Lautenberg).
263. See id.
264. See S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996).
265. 142 CONG. REC. S11,033-04, 11,038 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996).
266. S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996).
Joint Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Environmental Enforcement
(a) Chapter 232 of title 18 is amended by adding after Section 3673
the following new Section 3674:
Sec. 3674. Reimbursement of State, local, or tribal government
costs for assistance in Federal investigation and prosecution of en-
vironmental crimes.
(a) Upon the motion of the United States, any person who is found
guilty of a criminal violation of the Federal environmental laws set
forth in subsection (b) below, or conspiracy to violate such laws,
may be ordered to pay the costs incurred by a State, local, or tribal
government or an agency thereof for assistance to the Federal gov-
ernment's investigation and criminal prosecution of the case. Such
monies shall be paid to the State, local, or tribal government or
agency thereof and be used solely for the purpose of environmental
law enforcement.
Id.
267. See id. at § 4.
268. See id.
Protection of Government Employees and the Public
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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officers, firefighters, paramedics, and other public safety and
health personnel often are the first on the scene of an envi-
ronmental crime. In their efforts to protect others from
harm, they themselves may suffer injury or death resulting
from other people's criminal mishandling of dangerous
materials . ,,269 Section 4 provides for an enhanced penalty
for criminals who cause such harm.270 "For enhanced pun-
ishment to be imposed, section 4 requires that the defendant
commit the underlying environmental crime and that the
crime be the direct or proximate cause of serious bodily injury
or death."271 This section requires that actual harm occur,
but does not require the defendant to intend or know that his
act will or does cause death or serious injury.272
Section 5 of the bill creates another act entitled, Environ-
mental Crimes Training Act of 1996, which allows the EPA
Administrator to establish a new division designated the
"State, Local, and Tribal Environmental Enforcement Train-
ing Program."273 This section attempts to address enforce-
(a) Chapter 39 of title 18, Unites States Code, is amended by adding
the following the section:
Sec. 838. Protection of government employees and the public from
environmental crimes
(a) Any person who commits a criminal violation of a Federal envi-
ronmental law identified in this subsection that is the direct or
proximate cause of serious bodily injury to or death of any other
person, including a Federal, State, local or tribal government em-
ployee performing official duties as a result of the violation, shall be
subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years, a fine
of not more than $500,000, or both and, if the defendant is an or-
ganization, to a fine of not more than $2,000,000.
Id.
269. 142 CONG. REC. S11,033-04, 11,038 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Lautenberg).
270. See id.
271. Id. at S11,038-39.
272. See id. at S11,039.
273. S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 5 (1996).
Environmental Crimes Training for State, Local, and Tribal Law
Enforcement Environmental Crimes Training Act of 1996:
(b) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, as
soon as practicable, within the Office of Enforcement and Compli-
ance Assurance, shall establish the State, local, and Tribal Envi-
ronmental Enforcement Training Program ... State, local, and
35
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ment officials' training needs that are created by the
burgeoning number of environmental statutes. "State and lo-
cal governments are undertaking an expanded role in envi-
ronmental enforcement, not only of their own laws but also of
federal statutes pursuant to delegated authority."274 In addi-
tion, the section addresses the expansion of the EPA's Na-
tional Enforcement Training Institute where non-federal
enforcement personnel are often trained in environmental
crimes investigation.275
The statute of limitations for prosecuting an environ-
mental crime is lengthened by the bill. 27 6 The statute of limi-
tations that applies to a violator who has engaged in
"affirmative acts of concealment of specified crimes" is ex-
tended by three years.277 Most federal crimes are presently
subject to a five-year statute of limitations.278 "Criminals
who are the most deceptive, and thus able to hide their
wrongdoing the longest, are most likely to escape the legal
consequences of their acts through expiration of the statute of
limitations."279 Section 6 ameliorates this problem by ex-
tending the statute of limitations "for up to three years be-
yond the traditional 5-year period when the defendant
commits an affirmative act of concealment."280 The bill does
not extend the period beyond eight years after discovery.281
"For example, if a violator committed an affirmative act of
tribal law enforcement personnel shall include, among others, the
following: inspectors, civil and criminal investigators, technical ex-
perts, regulators, government lawyers, and police.
Id.
274. 142 CONG. REC. S11,033-04, 11,039 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Lautenberg).
275. See id.
276. See S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 6 (1996).
277. Id.
278. 18 U.S.C. § 3282.
279. 142 CONG. REC. S11,033-04, 11,039 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Lautenberg).
280. Id. at S11,039.
281. S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 6 (1996).
Statute of Limitations
(a) Chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by ad-




concealment and the environmental crime[s] were not discov-
ered until three, four, or five years after it was committed,
Section 6 would extend the statute of limitations to 6, 7, or 8
years after the crime was committed."28 2 If a concealment vi-
olation were discovered immediately subsequent to its com-
mission, then the normal five year statute of limitations
would appertain. 28 3
Section 8 authorizes the federal courts to administer res-
titution to environmental crime victims. 28 4 Current federal
statutes provide restitution to victims of violent and economic
crimes but, do not adequately address the costs incurred by
environmental crimes. 285 For instance, "an environmental
crime may cause more widespread and longstanding damage,
with the harm inflicted on all members of a community or
(a) No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for a violation
of, or a conspiracy to violate, any of the offenses listed in subsection
(b) unless the indictment is returned or the information is filed
within five years after the offense is committed; however, when a
person commits an affirmative act that conceals the offense from
any Federal, State, local, or tribal government agency, that person
shall not be prosecuted, tried, or punished for a violation of, or a
conspiracy to violate, any of the offenses listed below in subsection
(b) unless the indictment is returned or the information is filed
within five years after the offense is committed, or within three
years after the offense is discovered by a government agency,
whichever is later but in no event later than eight years after the
offense is committed.
Id.
282. 142 CONG. REC. S11,033-04, 11,039 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Lautenberg).
283. See id.
284. S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 8 (1996).
Environmental Crimes Restitution
Section 3663(b) of title 18, United States Code .... is amended by
... adding after paragraph (5) the following new paragraph - (6)
in the case of an offense resulting in pollution of or damage to the
environment, pay for removal and remediation of the environmen-
tal pollution or damage and restoration of the environment, to the
extent of the pollution or damage resulting from the offense; in such
case, the term victim' in section 3663(a)(2) includes a community or
communities, whether or not members are individually identified.
Id.
285. See 142 CONG. REC. Sl1,033-04, 11,039 (daily ed. Sept.19, 1996) (state-
ment of Sen. Lautenberg).
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communities affected by the environmental pollution or dam-
age."28 6 The harm caused to collective communities is ad-
dressed by this section, and no longer limits federal
imposition of restitution exclusively to individuals. 28 7
The bill also prevents defendants from hiding their as-
sets in order to avoid paying for environmental violations.288
286. Id.
287. See S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 8 (1996).
288. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,033-04, 11,039.
Prevention of alienation or disposal of assets needed to remedy en-
vironmental harms caused by environmental crimes.
(a). Chapter 39 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by ad-
ding after section 838 the following new section-
Sec. 839. Prejudgment orders to secure payment for environmental
damage.
(a) At the time of filing of an indictment or information for the vio-
lation of any of the statutory provisions set forth in section 838(a) of
this chapter, or at any time thereafter, if, after notice to the defend-
ant, the United States shows probable cause to believe that-
(1) the defendant will conceal, alienate or dispose of property, or
place property outside the jurisdiction of the Federal district courts;
and
(2) the defendant will thereby reduce or impair the defendant's abil-
ity to pay restitution, in whole or in part, including removal and
remediation of environmental pollution or damage and restoration
of the environment resulting from the statutory violation, the dis-
trict court may order the defendant not to alienate or dispose of any
such property, or place such property outside the jurisdiction of the
Federal district courts, without leave of the court. The United
States shall bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the projected cost for the removal and remediation of the
environmental pollution or damage and restoration of the
environment.
(b) Defenses
The defendant may establish the following affirmative defenses to a
motion by the government under this section-
(1) that the defendant possesses other assets sufficient to pay resti-
tution, including the costs of removal and remediation of the envi-
ronmental pollution or damage and restoration of the environment
resulting from the statutory valuation, provided that the defendant
places those other assets under the control of the court, or
(2) that the defendant has made full restitution, including the re-
moval and remediation of the environmental pollution or damage
and restoration of the environment.
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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In addressing pending criminal environmental charges, the
court may get an order preventing the defendant from dispos-
ing of assets without leave of the court. 289 The purpose of
this section is to ensure the defendant's ability to pay restitu-
tion fees. 290
The focus of this Comment is the attempt provision of the
ECEA. The bill states (as would be added to CWA § 309 as
section (d)): "Any person who attempts to commit the conduct
that constitutes any offense under paragraphs (2), (3) or (4) of
this subsection shall be subject to the same penalties as those
prescribed by such offense."29 1
The bill's notably absent definition of attempt may lead
to varied interpretations. Attempt may be defined as "an in-
tent combined with an act falling short of the thing intended.
It may be described as an endeavor to do an act, carried be-
yond mere preparation, but short of execution."292 The Model
Penal Code, however, defines attempt as:
(c) Procedures-
Any proceeding under this section is governed by the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
(d) Property Defined-
For the purposes of this section, 'property' shall include-
(1) Real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found
in land; and
(2) Tangible and intangible personal property, including money,
rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities.
(e) Expiration of Order-
The court may amend an Order issued pursuant to this section at
any time. In no event, however, shall the Order extend beyond sen-





291. S. 2096, 104th Cong. § 7 (1996).
292. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 127 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., State v. Stewart,
537 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), in which the court defined attempt to com-
mit a crime as: (1) an intent to commit it; (2) an overt act toward its commis-
sion; (3) failure of commission; and (4) the apparent possibility of commission.
Id. at 581.
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Acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
commission of the crime, [the perpetrator]:
(a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute
the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he be-
lieves them to be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the
crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of
causing or with the belief that it will cause such result
without further conduct on his part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the
circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omis-
sion constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. 293
The Model Penal Code also states:
Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step
under Subsection (1)(c) of this Section unless it is strongly
corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Without neg-
ativing the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if
strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall
not be held insufficient as a matter of law: (pertinent parts
listed)
(e) possession of materials to be employed in the commis-
sion of the crime, which are specially designed for such un-
lawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the
actor under the circumstances;
(f) possession, collection, or fabrication of materials to be
employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the
place contemplated for its commission, where such posses-
sion, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of
the actor under the circumstances. 294
Other legal scholars state that "[t]here is a point, how-
ever, somewhere between formation of the intent and actual
commission of the crime at which the criminal taking overt
action toward the accomplishment of the intended crime has
gone so far in carrying out his purpose that he is guilty of an




attempt to commit the crime."295 As stated in State v.
Damms, "[s]ound public policy would seem to support the ma-
jority view that impossibility not apparent to the actor should
not absolve him from the offense of attempt to commit the
crime he intended."296
Braxton v. United States297 illustrates the analysis for
determining if an attempted crime has occurred. The defend-
ant was charged with "(1) an attempt to kill a deputy United
States marshal, (2) assault on a deputy marshal, and (3) the
use of a firearm during a crime of violence." 298 Braxton pled
guilty to assaulting the marshal and using a firearm, but pled
not guilty to the charge of attempting to kill the marshal.299
The marshal had a warrant for Braxton's arrest and at-
tempted to contact the defendant at his apartment. 300 As the
marshal opened the apartment door, Braxton fired a gunshot
at the doorway.301 The contradictory evidence presented by
the government alleged that the bullets had both lodged in
the door and passed through the doorway.30 2
The Court relied on common law for the requisite ele-
ments of attempt since the elements were absent in the perti-
nent statute.30 3 The elements upon which the Court relied
included a "specific intent to commit the unlawful act."30 4
The Court held that since Braxton denied intending to kill
the marshal, in addition to the lack of evidence that Braxton
was "shooting at" the marshal, it could not be specifically es-
tablished that he violated the attempt provision of the rele-
vant statute.305
295. EDWARD ELDEFONSO & ALAN R. COFFEY, CRIMINAL LAW HISTORY-PHILOS-
OPHY-ENFORCEMENT 49 (1981).
296. State v. Damms, 100 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Wis.1960).
297. 500 U.S. 344 (1991).




302. See 500 U.S. at 344.
303. Id. at 351 n.*.
304. Id. at 351 (construing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).
305. See id. at 350-51.
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I. The Attempt Provision of the ECEA
The ECEA creates equal liability for environmental
crimes both committed and attempted. "There has been only
one attempt provision in Federal environmental criminal en-
forcement statutes. As a result, Federal agents can be placed
in the untenable situation of choosing between obtaining evi-
dence necessary for a criminal prosecution and preventing
pollution from occurring."30 6 The attempt provision allows
enforcement personnel to prevent the environment from be-
ing harmed, while simultaneously prosecuting a would-be
polluter. Additionally, the attempt provision "would allow
prosecution where a defendant purposely engages in conduct
that would constitute the crime if the circumstances were as
the defendant believes them to be."30 7
Senator Lautenberg claims the rationale for the ECEA's
attempt provisions is similar to that of attempt provisions in
federal criminal statutes: "Under these existing attempt
laws, when law enforcement authorities uncover planned
criminal activity and a substantial step is taken towards the
commission of the crime, the crime can be stopped before it is
completed and the perpetrator may still be prosecuted."30 8
Citing to federal laws of attempted robbery, damage to gov-
ernment property, obstruction of court orders and obtainment
of mail by fraud, Senator Lautenberg stated that the attempt
of the crime is treated as if the crime were actually commit-
ted.30 9 Ultimately, the purpose of the attempt provision is to
prevent the environment from being polluted and prosecute
those citizens who "knowingly" attempt to pollute. Senator
Lautenberg suggested that the attempt provision will make
possible undercover investigations. 310





310. Senator Lautenberg offered the following hypothetical:
While haulers are required by law to dispose of toxic materials in a
permitted hazardous waste disposal facility, often renegade trans-
porters dump in vacant lots, remote areas, and other unauthorized
locales. Once they have received information that illegal dumping
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/12
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III. Analysis
The rationale underlying the common law actions upon
which environmental law is premised is contradicted by the
rationale of the attempt provision in the ECEA as it is ap-
plied to the CWA. Neither trespass nor nuisance has a con-
comitant attempt cause of action. Although the public
nuisance cause of action does not require an intentional act,
it does require that some degree of harm occur. The attempt
provision of the ECEA seeks to criminalize behavior before it
imposes harm.
Courts, in deciding public nuisance actions, weigh the
unreasonableness of the interference by its significant effect
on the public or whether the harm to the public has a perma-
nent effect. An attempted violation of the CWA does not have
harm for the courts to weigh, nor does it provide a permanent
effect of harm to the public for the courts to determine. Addi-
tionally, the trespass cause of action, as a precursor to envi-
ronmental regulation, requires that an intentional invasion
of a legally protected interest occur in order to render a de-
fendant liable. An attempted violation of the CWA does not
create an actual invasion of another's interest because a pol-
lutant is not discharged. The practical effects of the attempt
provision, therefore, are incongruous with the principles of
environmental law's common law foundation.
is occurring, Federal agents conduct surveillance of hazardous
waste transporters. But, because there is no attempt provision in
statutes defining environmental crimes, if agents prevent a trans-
porter from dumping hazardous waste, the perpetrator cannot be
prosecuted for illegal dumping because no environmental crime has
occurred. Under current law, only by damaging the environment
by allowing the hazardous waste dumping to occur, can the Govern-
ment build a case to prosecute a person for illegal dumping ....
The [attempt] provision adds a new dimension to the protection of
the environment: the capability of officials to engage in undercover
operations. These investigations will allow Federal officers to con-
duct 'sting' operations by substituting benign substances for the ac-
tual pollutants, and prosecute, to the fullest extent of the law, those
violators who engaged in behavior they know to be illegal.
142 CONG. Rac. S11,033-04, 11,040 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
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An application of the attempt provision of the ECEA to
several of the cases previously discussed in Part II, produces
inequitable results. In the Strandquist3 ll case, at what point
would the defendant's actions be considered an attempted
crime? Strandquist was aware of the fact that he and his em-
ployees were pumping raw sewage into a storm grate. He tes-
tified, however, that he was not aware that the sewage
traveled to the water basin thereby constituting a discharged
pollutant into navigable waters under the CWA. Pursuant to
the ECEA, Strandquist could potentially be guilty of attempt-
ing to violate the CWA at the time he became aware of the
marina's septic tanks' inability to hold all of the marina's
sewage.
Similar to the would-be polluter in Lautenberg's hypo-
thetical, a pollutant would have been discharged if the facts
were as Strandquist presumed them to be. Perhaps Strand-
quist and his employees would be convicted of attempting to
"knowingly" commit an environmental crime at the point that
they possessed the sewage prior to loading it into tankers to
transport it to the storm grate. Strandquist possessed "pollu-
tants" and intended to discharge them into navigable waters.
However, the possession of pollutants is not what the CWA
seeks to deter. It is a statute that addresses the prevention
of discharged pollutants into navigable waters. 312
In Boldt, the plant manager was aware that partially
treated wastewater would be discharged into navigable wa-
ters.313 Boldt possessed knowledge similar to that of
Lautenberg's hypothetical polluter- he was aware that pol-
lutants would be discharged. The plant's system was
designed to treat wastewater, but was being used at twice its
capacity level at the time Boldt was hired as plant manager.
Under the ECEA's attempt provision, Boldt could be found
guilty of attempting to violate the CWA at the point he was
hired and received corporate responsibility for the waste-
water treatment.
311. Strandquist, 993 F.2d 395.
312. "[It is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the naviga-
ble waters be eliminated by 1985 ..... CWA § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
313. Boldt, 929 F.2d 35.
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In Boldt's case, a bypass was necessary because the
plant's treatment system failed. The bypass contained four
times the amount of copper allowed by federal regulation.
The allowance of bypasses as defined in the CWA, is contra-
dictory to the proposed attempt provision. For example, in a
less egregious situation than Boldt's, suppose a plant man-
ager knows that his treatment system is beginning to break
down. At that point, the manager possesses pollutants that
are inevitably going to enter navigable waters. Although by-
passes are acceptable defenses to violations of the CWA, if the
ECEA were enacted, it would be possible to convict the man-
ager at the time a bypass occurs and the treatment system
began to break down. The attempt provision would negate
viable defenses provided in the CWA, and undermine the ac-
cepted understanding that machinery may malfunction,
causing the plant manager to "knowingly" discharge
pollutants.
The manager of a sewage treatment plant convicted of
violating the CWA in Weitzenhoff defended the illegal dis-
charges of pollutants on the basis of his interpretation of the
plant's permit.314 An application of the attempt provision to
the manager's situation requires both a discussion of the
CWA's designation as a public welfare statute and an exami-
nation of the elements required to constitute a knowing viola-
tion of the CWA. In Weitzenhoff, Hopkins, and Ahmad, the
respective courts addressed the applicability of the CWA as
interpreted as a public welfare statute. The courts' interpre-
tation of "knowingly" in the CWA was the touchstone of the
Hopkins and Weitzenhoff courts' designation of the CWA as a
public welfare statute.
All of the defendants were convicted by the lower courts
of "knowingly" violating the CWA. Pursuant to the reasoning
espoused in Hopkins, where the court adopted the Interna-
tional Minerals analysis of what constitutes "knowingly" in
federal statutes, in order to be convicted under the CWA, one
does not need to know that he is in violation of a federal stat-
ute. He simply needs to know that he is committing the con-
314. 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir.1993) amended by 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994).
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duct that is regulated. For example, he is aware of the fact
that he is discharging zinc, not that his act violates a specific
effluent limitation.
However, the courts following the reasoning in Interna-
tional Minerals did not consider the House of Representa-
tive's Report concerning the 1987 CWA Amendments, which
asserted that the purpose of the proposed amendments was
to "provide penalties for dischargers or individuals who
knowingly or negligently violate or cause violation of the Act's
requirements."315 Ascertainable from both the legislative
history and the statutory language of the CWA, it is evident
that Congress intended to "require knowledge of both the
physical activity resulting in the violation and the illegality of
that activity."316 The Weitzenhoff court, for instance, relied
on legislative reports out of context. 31 7 The section of the
CWA that Weitzenhoff was alleged to have violated was
§ 1319(c)(2)(A), which concerns a defendant who "knowingly"
discharges a pollutant. The legislative text, however, which
the court relied upon, referred to criminal liability for non-
compliance with permit requirements in § 1319(c)(2)(B). 318
The International Minerals analysis, as applied to CWA
violations, requires that the substance being handled by the
defendant be such that it should place him on notice that the
activity he is engaging in is comprehensively regulated. Un-
like the hazardous acids that the defendant in International
Minerals was handling, a person would not necessarily be
aware that when he is discharging hot water into a river, he
is violating the CWA. As explained by the U.S. Supreme
315. H.R. Rep. No. 189, 99th Cong. 29-30 (1985)(emphasis added).
316. Kevin Phillip Cichetti, United States v. Weitzenhoff: Reading Out the
Knowingly From Knowingly Violates in the Clean Water Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(2)(A), 9 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 1183, 1196 (1996).
317. See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1295-96 (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting).
318. S. Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong. 29 (1985). The report stated, "[c]riminal lia-
bility shall ... attach to any person who is not in compliance with all applicable
Federal, State and local requirements and permits and causes a POTW (pub-
licly owned treatment works) to violate effluent limitations or conditions in any
permit issued to the treatment works." Id.
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Court in Staples,319 "[alutomobiles ... might ... be termed
'dangerous' devices and are highly regulated at both the state
and federal levels," but it would be doubtful that Congress
would apply strict liability to someone whose car's emissions
levels exceed the acceptable amount. 320
In Liparota v. United States,321 the Court stated that the
conduct involved in assessing whether an activity is a public
welfare offense must be the "type of conduct that a reasonable
person should know is subject to stringent public regulation
and may seriously threaten the community's health or
safety."322 An application of this test to the CWA reveals that
it is not a public welfare statute. It would be difficult for a
reasonable person to ascertain that dirt and rocks, which are
considered pollutants under the CWA, are subject to strin-
gent regulation. Additionally, the allowance of bypasses by
the CWA contradicts the Liparota analysis. The bypasses do
"seriously threaten the community's health or safety," but
they are viable defenses under the CWA which permits them
to occur.
Conducting a simple syntax analysis of the "knowingly"
provision of the CWA, reveals that "knowingly" applies to "vi-
olates."323 If Congress wanted "knowingly" to apply to all ele-
ments of the relevant section, it could have altered the
language to reflect its intent. As indicated by both statutory
construction and legislative history, Congress intended for
those convicted of "knowingly" violating the CWA to have a
culpable state-of-mind, and not merely knowledge of their
actions.
The status of the CWA as a public welfare statute is sig-
nificant in analyzing the ECEA's attempt provision. Most im-
portantly, there has never been a recorded American case
that addresses an attempted violation of a public welfare
statute. It would be impossible to convict a person of at-
319. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
320. Id. at 614.
321. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
322. Id. at 433.
323. See Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1294 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citing
GEORGE 0. CURME, A GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 72 (1935)).
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tempting to commit an act, which requires proof of a mens
rea, for an offense that does not account for the scienter of the
defendant. Secondly, the CWA provision that the bill's at-
tempt provision is proposed to be attached, does contain a
mens rea - "knowingly." If the CWA is deemed a public wel-
fare statute, an attempt provision cannot be added.
The court in Ahmad did not consider the CWA a public
welfare statute and reversed the defendant's conviction be-
cause the knowing element had to be applied to each element
of the violation: (1) discharged or added; (2) a pollutant; (3) to
navigable waters; (4) from a point source; and (5) without a
permit. As has been established by the Court, a public wel-
fare statute or offense does not require a mens rea to be
proven, and those statutes that do require a knowing mens
rea must have it applied to each element of the offense. 324
Pursuant to this line of reasoning, the government would
have to prove that a defendant attempted to "knowingly" dis-
charge what he knew was a pollutant into what he knew were
navigable waters. The question then becomes, how does the
government prove that a defendant attempted to "knowingly"
violate the CWA? The effect of the knowing mens rea of some
of the CWA's criminal provisions along with an application of
the attempt provision, would force the government to prove
the defendant knew he was discharging a pollutant. Unlike
other environmental statutes, the CWA prohibits the dis-
charge of materials that may not put a would-be polluter on
notice of possible federal offenses. For example, a handler of
sulfuric acid knows that it is a hazardous material just by the
existence of its dangerous properties. Pursuant to RCRA, a
prosecution would be possible for an attempted disposal of
that material. However, a person who is washing his car and
discharges the car cleanser down a sewer hole may not be
aware that he has discharged a pollutant into navigable
water. Therefore, knowing what constitutes a pollutant
324. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); United States v.




presents causation obstacles when combined with the ECEA's
attempt provision.
The purpose of the attempt provision is, in theory, com-
patible with the purpose of the CWA. As applied, however, to
practical situations, the attempt provision may cause judicial
bedlam because providing sufficient proof that someone
"knowingly" discharged a pollutant will create causation ob-
stacles. The government would have difficulty ascertaining
the state of mind of someone who is un"knowingly" discharg-
ing a pollutant, and thereby potentially convict innocent peo-
ple. In proving a violation of the CWA, the government will
be unable to substantiate, as required by basic attempt provi-
sions, that a person intended to commit a violation of the
CWA.
Assuming that the CWA is not a public welfare statute,
the attempt provision still poses other problems. For exam-
ple, in Braxton v. United States325 the Court applied the com-
mon law elements of attempt to a statute that failed to
itemize the elements of what constituted an attempted viola-
tion.326 In the case of the ECEA, the proposed attempt provi-
sion does not specify what constitutes an attempted violation
of the CWA. Since there is not a common law definition of
"attempt to pollute," the courts will be left to adopt whichever
application of attempt they choose. This judicial discretion,
in interpreting a statute which is supposed to be uniform
throughout the country, would lead to inconsistent sentences
and penalties for violators of the CWA.
Senator Lautenberg's hypothetical of replacing hazard-
ous material with benign substances also suffers from sub-
stantive deficiency. For example, in order to be convicted
under the CWA, a person must actually discharge a pollutant
into navigable waters. If federal officers, for example, have
replaced what a distributor presumed to be copper-laced
water, with pure tap water, then the distributor has not dis-
charged a pollutant. The attempt clause may simply cloud
325. 500 U.S. 344 (1991).
326. Id. at 351 n.*.
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what currently constitutes an environmental crime because
of the procedural ambiguities created.
The only remedy for the attempt provision's deficiencies
is not to attach it to the knowing provisions of environmental
statutes. For example, in the CWA, an attempt provision
may be added as an entirely new section that does not incor-
porate a mens rea requirement. However, any variation of an
attempt provision would be inapplicable in those jurisdictions
that interpret the CWA as a public welfare statute. It is both
practically and judicially impossible to apply an attempt pro-
vision to a public welfare statute. Courts would have to rec-
ognize that the CWA is not a public welfare statute prior to
the addition of the attempt provision, in its present form to
the CWA.
Moreover, an attempt provision would have unreliable
and inconsistent effects on those persons who handle regu-
lated substances. An attempted violation of discharging such
commonplace substances such as dirt or hot water, would not
provide notice of a potential violation to the defendant. The
ambiguity resulting from the attempt provision's attachment
to the CWA would also allow many jurisdictions to apply the
rule of lenity in interpreting the statute. The rule of lenity,
which protects defendants by compelling courts to "strictly
construe ambiguous statutory . .. [language] in a manner
most favorable to defendants,"327 would allow many polluters
to escape conviction based on legal technicalities.
IV. Conclusion
The ECEA, although meritorious in its objectives, should
not be implemented in its present form. The legal uncer-
tainty of the attempt provision may cause an abuse of
prosecutorial discretion because of its boundless applications.
In addition, the attempt of an environmental crime will be
difficult to(l) define in a criminal law context; and (2) prove in
court, as was illustrated by its application to the cases dis-
cussed in Part II. For example, in order to be convicted of
327. David E. Filippi, Unleashing the Rule of Lenity: Environmental Enforc-
ers Beware!, 26 ENvTL. L. 923 (1996).
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violating the CWA a violator must have discharged a pollu-
tant into navigable waters. If the pollutant has been replaced
with tap water by federal enforcement investigators, as Sena-
tor Lautenberg hypothesized, then a true pollutant has not
been discharged. Distinguishing the exact point at which a
defendant is attempting to commit an environmental crime
may also create difficulties in proving causation.
Moreover, the rationale underpinning an attempt provi-
sion conflicts with both the CWA's common law foundational
principles and its judicial classification as a public welfare
statute. In both nuisance and trespass actions, judicial ac-
tion redresses damages to the plaintiffs property, invasion of
the property, or enjoyment of his land. The attempt provision
undermines those common law rationales because no dam-
ages result from an attempted discharge of a pollutant. In
addition, common law does not recognize a cause of action for
attempting to violate either of the common law actions upon
which environmental law is founded.
The attempt provision also contradicts the reasoning em-
ployed in those jurisdictions that classify the CWA as a pub-
lic welfare statute. There has never been an attempt clause
added to a public welfare statute. This results from the fact
that public welfare statutes do not require mens rea, and
therefore cannot have attempted violations which would re-
quire mens rea. The CWA regulates substances that are both
hazardous and commonplace. Therefore, the usual "deleteri-
ous" nature of substances associated with public welfare stat-
utes is not consistently present in CWA offenses. Potential
violators would not be on notice that they are handling sub-
stances which are comprehensively regulated because dis-
charging hot water or sand into a well, for example, would
not necessarily reflect the serious nature associated with the
offense.
Despite the ECEA's substantive deficiencies, it repre-
sents the continuing story of environmental law's progres-
sion. As Justice Holmes stated, "we must know what it has
been and what it tends to become" in order to understand
1998] 785
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it.328 The fact that some government officials are seeking to
expand criminal liability and increase penalties for environ-
mental crimes, however, suggests that environmental law
may not only become more than it has been, but may even be
more than innocent citizens expect.
328. See HOLMES, supra note 1.
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